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DOUBLE DOMICILE AND FEDERAL INTERPLEADER
REVISITED
by Elizabeth Whitaker Zervopoulos
Intangible property, unlike real property and tangible personal property,
is unprotected constitutionally from the imposition of death taxes by more
than one state.' A network of state legislation channeling the right to tax
to the state of the decedent's domicile2 has been the primary means by
which intangibles have escaped multiple taxation. Neither legislation nor
judicial proceedings, however, have been effective in precluding the possi-
bility of multiple taxation when two or more states have claimed to be the
state of domicile. In this situation, each of several claiming states has the
power to seek a favorable judgment of domicile in its own state courts and
force the estate to pay full taxes. Although commentators have insisted
that allowing each of several states to assess full death taxes is inequitable,
the situation has continued for decades. Recently, four Supreme Court
Justices expressed a belief that these inequities need not continue, because
an estate can bring a statutory interpleader action in federal district court
whereby all the claiming states can be bound to a single determination of
domicile. This Comment analyzes the validity and efficacy of this method
of remedying multiple taxation and concludes that access by an estate to
1. The term death tax includes two forms of taxes levied at the time of the taxpayer's
death. The first is an estate tax, which is a tax on the right to transmit the decedent's prop-
erty to the donees. The second is an inheritance or succession tax, which is a tax on the
donee's right to receive. [1974] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) § 1000.
2. The right of the state of domicile to tax is based on the doctrine of mobilia sequunter
personam (movables follow the [law of the] person), BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (5th ed.
1979), pursuant to which the property is deemed to be located where the owner of the prop-
erty is domiciled. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. I, 10 (1927); Blackstone v.
Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 204 (1903).
A person is domiciled in the state in which that person intends to make his home. Fur-
ther, a person may have only one domicile. Thus, if a person has two or more dwelling
places, his domicile is at the earlier dwelling place unless another is his principal home.
Once a person acquires a domicile, he retains that domicile until he acquires a new one.
Three types of domicile are recognized today. The first is the domicile of origin, which is
fixed in the state in which a person is born. The second is the domicile of choice, which
supersedes the domicile of origin. A person legally capable of changing his domicile ac-
quires a domicile of choice by physically dwelling in a place with intent to make that place
his home. The third is the domicile fixed by operation of law, which is applied today mostly
to children who are considered as a matter of law to be domiciled with their father. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11-23 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND)]. See Reese, Does Domicil Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 589 (1955), for a discussion of how the definition of domicile may vary depending on
the court construing the definition, and on the subject of litigation.
The term "domicile" may be contrasted with the term "residence." The definition of resi-
dence must be determined in each legal context. Frequently, residence is equivalent in
meaning to domicile. At times, however, residence means a domicile at which a person
actually dwells. At other times, residence means the place where a person lives for a period
of time, without necessarily having an intent to establish a home at that place. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), supra, § 11, Comment k.
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federal district court for the purposes of avoiding multiple taxation is not
yet a reality.
I. DEATH TAXES AND DOMICILE: A DILEMMA
Only the state in which real property and tangible personal property is
physically located may constitutionally levy death taxes on the transfer of
such property.3 Intangible personal property, however, is not bound phys-
ically to any particular place. 4 Consequently, the Supreme Court has ex-
perienced difficulty in determining which states may tax intangible
personal property.' Initially, the Court recognized that more than one
state could tax the property.6 Subsequently, in a series of decisions7 culmi-
nating in First National Bank v. Maine,' the Court established that the
simultaneous taxation by two or more states of the same intangible prop-
erty interest violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court reasoned that if one type of property, tangible property, was
constitutionally protected from multiple taxation, another type of prop-
erty, intangible property, should also be protected.9 Several Justices con-
sistently criticized this principle, I° and finally the dissent achieved a
majority, overruling First National Bank in State Tax Commission v. Al-
drich.I" The Court's revised position was that any state could impose a
death tax upon assets of a decedent whose rights in such assets were at
least in part protected by that state's laws. 2 The Court returned to the
3. See Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v.
Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); Union Refrigera-
tor Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 119 U.S. 194 (1905); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
§ 62 (3d ed. 1977).
4. See Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657, 660 (1942); Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 206 (1905); Marsh, Multiple Death Taxation in the United
States, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 69, 71 (1961).
5. See State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 179-81 (1942); Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1930); [1974] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP.
(CCH) 1675.
6. See Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
7. Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281
U.S. 586 (1930); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
8. 284 U.S. 312, 327 (1932), overruled, State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174
(1942). The Court stated:
The rule of immunity from taxation by more than one state . . . rests for its
justification upon the fundamental conception that the transmission from the
dead to the living of a particular thing, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is an
event which cannot take place in two or more states at one and the same time.
Id at 326.
9. Id at 326-27; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
10. See First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 331-34 (1932) (Holmes, Brandeis, &
Stone, JJ., dissenting); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1, 10 (1932)
(Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., acquiescing); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595-99 (1930)
(Holmes, Brandeis & Stone, JJ., dissenting); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280
U.S. 204, 214-18 (1930) (Stone, J., concurring; Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 95 (1929) (Brandeis & Stone, JJ., concurring;
Holmes, J., dissenting).
11. 316 U.S. 174, 181 (1942).
12. Id at 181-82; see Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486 (1947); State Tax
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multiple tax theory of taxing intangibles for several reasons. First, the
Court stated that a tax on intangibles is merely a way of distributing the
costs of government to those who enjoyed its benefits. 3 Secondly, the
Court feared that resort to the fourteenth amendment would create more
difficulties and injustices than it would remove. " Finally, the Court stated
that it would need to extend unduly the fourteenth amendment in order to
afford protection against multiple taxation of intangibles.'"
As a result of the Aldrich decision, the estate of a mobile decedent faced
a large potential tax burden. Many states, however, chose to mitigate the
potential tax liability of estates by enacting tax exemption laws.' 6 These
laws vested the right to impose death taxes in the state of the decedent's
domicile.' 7 As all states recognized that a person may have only one dom-
icile,' 8 the state statutory schemes ensured that normally only one death
tax would be levied on a decedent's assets. The mutual exemption laws,
however, did not address one potential source of multiple taxation. 19 Two
or more states still could claim to be the decedent's domicile.2° As each
state tended to consider its own determination of domicile as the correct
one, 2 1 each would assess a death tax on the entire value of the decedent's
intangible estate.22
Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); Graves
v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); [1974] INHER., EST.
& GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) 1675.
13. 316 U.S. at 180; see Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 370 (1939).
14. 316 U.S. at 181; see State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 179 & 181 (1942);
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 373-74 (1939); 30 COLUM. L. REV. 404 (1930).
15. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter suggested that multiple taxation was a
political problem that state legislatures could solve by enacting reciprocal exemption laws.
316 U.S. at 181; see State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 184 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 325 (Stone, J., dissenting). See also
State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 181 ("[E]ven though we believed that a different
system should be designed to protect against multiple taxation, it is not our province to
provide it."). See generally Brown, The Present Status of Multiple Taxation of Intangible
Property, 40 MICH. L. REV. 806 (1942); Guterman, Revitalization of Multiple State Death
Taxation, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1249 (1942); [1974] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH)
1680.
16. For a listing of the state exemption laws, see [1970] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP.
(CCH) 12,080. States were motivated to enact such legislation because they hoped to gain
more from stimulating the business of their banks, trust companies, and brokers than by
levying inheritance taxes on intangibles owned by nonresidents. Tweed & Sargent, Death
and Taxes Are Certain-But What of Domicile, 53 HARV. L. REV. 68, 70 (1939).
17. The most common type of exemption legislation provides that state Y will not tax
the intangible property of a person domiciled in state X if state X will reciprocate and ex-
empt the intangible property of persons domiciled in state Y. Other types of legislation
include: those absolutely prohibiting the taxation of nonresidents; those taxing only those
intangibles used in the course of business within that state; those permitting taxation unless
the state of domicile actually taxes the intangibles; and those allowing reciprocal exemption
only for United States domiciliaries. Nevada is the only state to assess no death taxes what-
soever. [1970] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) 12,080. See generally Current Legis-
lation, Legislative Efforts in New York to Avoid Multplicity in Inheritance Taxation, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 806(1928).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 11.
19. [1974] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) 1680.
20. Id 1425D.
21. Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 384 (1940).
22. A classic example of the attempts by two states to tax the same intangible estate is
1980] 1243
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Legislative schemes providing for arbitration or compromise have at-
tempted to adjust conflicting claims between states to a decedent's domi-
cile.23 An example of a compromise statute is the Uniform Act on
Interstate Compromise of Death Taxes.24 Under this Act, conflicting
claims are adjusted by tax officials of claimant states who negotiate for a
percentage of the full amount of their claim.2 5 All claimant states, there-
fore, receive a partial tax. An example of an arbitration statute is the Uni-
form Act on Interstate Arbitration of Death Taxes, 26 which provides that
an arbitration board resolve conflicting claims by making a binding deter-
mination of domicile. One state thus receives a full tax under the arbitra-
tion scheme. Although such legislation has the potential for solving the
multiple tax problem, seventeen states have failed to adopt a legislative
solution.27 Moreover, some of the arbitration and compromise legislation
is not mandatory, 28 and an estate therefore has no assurance that it will
escape multiple taxation.
Judicial intervention has been an alternative method of resolving con-
flicting claims of domicile between states. A claimant-state could seek a
single adjudication of domicile by consenting to suit in the courts of an-
other state.29 While the potential effectiveness of state court review is
demonstrated in cases such as In re Trowbridge,30 claimant-states have
consented infrequently to such review. 3 1
set forth in the In re Dorrance's Estate litigation. See In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151,
163 A. 303 (1932), cert. deniedsub nom. Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 660 (1932); New
Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 580 (1932); In re Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601
(Prerog. Ct. 1932), aftd, 116 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 A. 503 (Prerog. Ct.), afl'dsub nom. Dorrance
v. Thayer-Martin, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 A. 902 (N.J.), cert. deniedsub nom. Hill v. Martin,
296 U.S. 393 (1935). This litigation is discussed in detail in Nash, And Again Multiple Taxa-
tion, 26 GEO. L.J. 288, 318-24 (1938).
23. The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I, is
ineffective to require one state to recognize a sister state's determination of domicile because
the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes a state court from compelling a sister state's
joinder in its proceedings. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961);
Worcester County Trust v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937); Baker v. Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394
(1917).
24. UNIFORM INTERSTATE COMPROMISE OF DEATH TAXES ACT § I.
25. See generally Guterman, A Poidance of Double Death Taxation of Estates and Trusts,
95 U. PA. L. REV. 701, 711-12 (1947).
26. UNIFORM INTERSTATE ARBITRATION OF DEATH TAXES ACT § 4.
27. The states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, and Wyoming. Nevada assesses no death tax. NEV. CONST. art. 10, § 1; see
[1975] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) 12,010, 12,035.
28. Marsh, supra note 4, at 86.
29. Id at 85; Nash, supra note 22, at 308.
30. 266 N.Y. 283, 194 N.E. 756 (1935). In this case, Connecticut, as a party-litigant,
intervened in proceedings in the State of New York on the issue of where the decedent had
domiciled and which state was entitled to tax his estate. The lower court determined that
New York was the state of domicile. After a detailed review of the facts, however, the
appellate court reversed and found Connecticut to be the state of domicile.
3 1. For examples of cases litigated between two states in state court, see In re Bourne's
Estate, 181 Misc. 238,41 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sur. Ct. 1943), afl'd, 267 A.D. 876,47 N.Y.S.2d 134,
af'd, 293 N.Y. 785, 58 N.E.2d 729 (1944); In re Benjamin's Estate, 176 Misc. 518, 27
N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sur. Ct. 1941), afl'd, 263 A.D. 981, 34 N.Y.S.2d 394, afd, 289 N.Y. 554, 43
N.E.2d 531 (1942); In re Hartshorne's Estate, 171 Misc. 27, 11 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sur. Ct. 1939);
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A claimant-state could also seek a single adjudication of domicile by
bringing an original action against another state before the United States
Supreme Court.32 In the landmark case of Texas v. Florida,33 the State of
Texas attempted to bring such an action in the Supreme Court. The bill of
complaint alleged that Texas, Florida, Massachusetts, and New York each
claimed to be the domicile of the decedent and therefore to have the sole
right to impose death taxes upon the decedent's intangible estate. The bill
of complaint further alleged that if all four states obtained a favorable
adjudication in their state courts, the estate assets would be insufficient to
satisfy the total tax liability. In the course of its review, the Court ad-
dressed sua sponte the issue of its jurisdiction in the original action before
it 34 and held that two jurisdictional prerequisites must be met. First, the
claims of the party-states must be mutually exclusive, as when several
states claim to be the sole domicile of a decedent. Secondly, the estate's
assets must be insufficient to satisfy the total tax liability should each state
independently decide it was the domicile. Since both conditions were pre-
sent, the Court reviewed the case on the merits and determined which state
was the domicile.35
The narrowness of the jurisdictional base established by Texas v.
Florida was demonstrated by the subsequent denial of Massachusetts' mo-
tion for leave to file a complaint in an original action to settle a dispute
with Missouri over the right to levy death taxes on intangible property.36
Recently, three Supreme Court Justices suggested that the jurisdictional
basis should be narrowed further. The Justices recommended that Texas v.
Florida be overruled and questioned whether two states should ever be
allowed to litigate their death tax claims before the Supreme Court.3 7
Supreme Court review, consequently, has been and probably will continue
to be only a limited means of resolving death tax claims.38
A final forum of judicial review is the federal district court. Pursuant to
In re Stone's Estate, 135 Misc. 736, 240 N.Y.S. 398 (Sur. Ct. 1929); In re Lyon's Estate, 117
Misc. 189, 191 N.Y.S. 260 (Sur. Ct. 1921), afr'd, 192 N.Y.S. 936 (App. Div. 1922).
One commentator has suggested that a state should not be criticized for refusing to submit
to the courts of another state that is likely in need of tax revenues. Nash, supra note 22, at
308-09.
32. "In all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This constitutional grant of jurisdiction is
treated in 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976), which provides that "The Supreme Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction of: (i) All controversies between two or more States
33. 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
34. Id at 405.
35. The Supreme Court adopted the finding of the special master that Massachusetts
was the state of domicile. The master found that the laws of the litigant-states were uni-
formly patterned after the common law formulation of domicile. The master, therefore,
followed the common law codification in the Restatement of Conflict ofLaws in determining
that the decedent had been domiciled in Massachusetts. Id at 413-28.
36. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939).
37. California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601 (1978).
38. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, § 15; Nash, supra note 22, at 314; Traynor, State Tax-
ation and the Supreme Court, 1938 Term, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13-18 (1939).
19801 1245
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the Federal Interpleader Act,39 a party holding assets claimed by more
than one person is empowered to join all claimants in a single suit to deter-
mine which claimant, if any, has a right to the assets. Theoretically, there-
fore, an estate could join states claiming to be the sole domicile of the
decedent in one suit to determine which state has the right to levy a death
tax.
40
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). The Act provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of
interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person, firm,
or corporation, association, or society having in his or its custody or
possession money or property of the value of $500 or more, or having
issued a note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument
of value or amount of $500 or more, or providing for the delivery or
payment or the loan of money or property of such amount or value, or
being under any obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500
or more, if
(1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as de-
fined in section 1332 of this title, are claiming or may claim to be enti-
tled to such money or property, or to any one or more of the benefits
arising by virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy or other instru-
ment, or arising by virtue of any such obligation; and if(2) the plaintiff
has deposited such money or property or has paid the amount of or the
loan or other value of such instrument or the amount due under such
obligation into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment of
the court, or has given bond payable to the clerk of the court in such
amount and with such surety as the court or judge may deem proper,
conditioned upon the compliance by the plaintiff with the future order
or judgment of the court with respect to the subject matter of the con-
troversy.
(b) Such an action may be entertained although the titles or claims of the
conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identi-
cal, but are adverse to and independent of one another.
40. An interpleader action is litigated in two stages. 3A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 22.14 (2d ed. 1979); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1714 (1972). In the first stage, the stakeholder deposits the claimed assets into the
registry of the court. 3A J. MOORE, supra, 1 22.14[l]. In an interpleader action brought by
an estate, the larger tax would be deposited into court if the tax has already been computed.
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1716; Chafee, supra note 21, at 387. If the tax has not
been computed, the estate would deposit a bond into court in an amount the court deemed
proper. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1716. The court would then determine whether
the stakeholder is entitled to interpleader relief. Id § 1714. The stakeholder must show,
among other things, that two or more persons may claim the deposited assets. See State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 368 U.S. 523, 531-33 (1967). The interests of these persons,
however, must be adverse. The interests of the claimants will be considered adverse if al-
though the claims are independent, the assets constituting the subject of the interpleader are
inadequate to satisfy all claims. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 368 U.S. 523 (1967);
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1705. Thus, if the butcher claims $300 and the baker
$400, the claims may be interpleaded if the stakeholder has $500 in assets. Additionally, the
interests may be adverse because legal rights giving rise to the claims are mutually exclusive.
See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961); Gannon v.
American Airlines, Inc., 251 F.2d 476 (10th Cir. 1958); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra,
§ 1705. Thus, provided a person has one domicile only, one state's claim to be the state of
domicile theoretically would be inimical to a sister state's claim to be the state of domicile.
Having determined that the parties are properly before it, the court may normally issue an
injunction against state proceedings to ensure the effectiveness of the interpleader remedy.
See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1717. The interpleader action would then progress
into its second stage, during which the court would judge the merits of the action. 3A J.
MOORE, supra, 22.14[2]. To judge the merits, the court would need to determine which
law it should follow in reaching its decision. This potentially complicated inquiry is not
1246 [Vol. 33
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In Worcester County Trust v. Riley4 1 the estate of Mr. Hunt attempted to
bring a statutory interpleader action to preclude California and Massachu-
setts from inconsistently determining the decedent's domicile. The estate
claimed that the collection efforts of the two states' tax officials threatened
to deprive the estate of its property without due process of law and asked
that the tax officials be enjoined from further collection efforts. The alle-
gation that the tax officials violated the Constitution was essential to the
estate's right to maintain the action.42 As the taxing officials were the
states' agents, the Court stated that suit against them would ordinarily be a
suit against the state.43 The eleventh amendment, however, precludes suits
in federal court by citizens against a state." The Court in Ex parte
Young45 had held that the eleventh amendment does not preclude a suit
enjoining a state agent alleged to have acted unconstitutionally. In such a
situation the officer would be "stripped of his official or representative
character and [be] subjected in his person to the consequences of his indi-
vidual conduct."4 6 Accordingly, as the suit would be against an individual
and not a state, the eleventh amendment would not bar the action.
The Worcester Court held that the Constitution does not require uni-
formity in the court decisions of different states as to the place of domicile.
Accordingly, each adjudication of the decedent's domicile was valid, and
the tax officials of neither state acted unconstitutionally in imposing taxes
based on the adjudication. Therefore, their actions were within the scope
of their official duties and were attributable to the states. The Ex parte
Young doctrine thus was inoperative and the eleventh amendment barred
the suit.
The Worcester decision marked the effective closing of the judicial doors
to estates threatened with multiple assessments of death taxes.47 The abil-
ity to initiate judicial review was now vested exclusively in claimant-states,
who stood to gain monetarily from a judgment that they were the state of
domicile. 8 The reaction of commentators to the Worcester decision has
addressed in this Comment. See generaly Farage, Multple Domicils and Multiple Inheri-
tance Taxes-4 Possible Solution, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 380 (1941). Following the
court's judgment, the estate would obtain its own discharge from the taxing officials of the
state adjudged to be the decedent's domicile. Chafee, supra note 21, at 387.
For further study of the interpleader action, see generally 3A J. MOORE, supra, 22.01-
.17; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, §§ 1701-1721; Chafee, Modernizing Interoleader, 30
YALE L.J. 814 (1921); Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685 (1924); Chafee, The
Federal Interpleader Act of 1936" I, 45 YALE L.J. 963 (1936); Chafee, supra note 21; Chafee,
Broadening the Second Stage of Interpleader, 56 HARV. L. REV. 541 (1943).
41. 302 U.S. 292 (1937).
42. Id at 296-97.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XI reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890), the amendment was construed to bar suits
brought not only by citizens of another state, but also by a citizen against his own state.
44. 302 U.S. at 296-97.
45. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
46. Id at 160.
47. [1974] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) 1425E; Nash, supra note 22, at 304.
48. See Nash, supra note 22, at 316 ("[T]o leave the solution of the problem of double
1980] 1247
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been largely negative. 9 Professor Chafee, considered to be the father of
the Federal Interpleader Act,5" typified this reaction when he stated, "[I]t
is highly unfair for both state governments to tell the taxpayer, 'You have
to pay only one tax,' and then make him pay twice."'" Despite such criti-
cism, however, the Worcester opinion has remained law for four de-
cades.52
II. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS IN CALIFORNIA V. TEXAS
Forty years after Worcester County v. Riley, the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to review that opinion in California v. Texas.5 3 Following the
death of Howard Hughes, the State of Texas instituted proceedings in
Texas state court to determine his domicile at the time of death for the
purpose of assessing death taxes. The State of California sought to enjoin
these proceedings and attempted to bring an original action before the
United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether Texas was the state
of domicile. In its motion for leave to file complaint, California alleged
that both California and Texas claimed to be the domicile of the deceased
and were both seeking to impose death taxes on the decedent's estate. Cal-
ifornia further alleged that if each state successfully imposed a death tax in
their respective courts, the assets of the estate would be insufficient to cover
the tax claims. The Supreme Court declined this opportunity to reexamine
Worcester and denied the motion without comment.54 Four Justices, how-
ever, appended three concurring opinions explaining their decision to deny
California's motion and expressing their belief that the holding in Worces-
ter had been abrogated by more recent precedent. Their views merit ex-
amination because they reveal the attitudes of a substantial number of
Supreme Court Justices and could be influential on lower courts. The con-
currence of one more Justice would create a majority for the view that
Worcester no longer prevents an estate's interpleader of two taxing
states.55
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens, stated in a foot-
note56 that Worcester had been substantially undercut by the decision of
domicile to be worked out by the unaided efforts of the states, can be of doubtful benefit at
best."). See also (1974] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) 1425E.
49. Nash, supra note 22, at 314; Tweed & Sargent, supra note 16, at 77. See also
Farage, supra note 40, at 380; Guterman, supra note 25, at 703-08; Lowndes, The Tax Deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, 1938 Term, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1939); Traynor, supra
note 38, at 13-21. But see Marsh, supra note 4, at 71.
50. California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 615-17 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). See gener-
ally articles by Professor Chafee cited in note 40 supra.
51. Chafee, supra note 21, at 384 (footnote omitted).
52. See [1974] INHER., EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) 1425E.
53. 437 U.S. 601 (1978).
54. Id
55. The votes of these four Justices also would be a sufficient number to grant a writ of
certiorari on the issue of taxation based on double-domicile adjudications. See generally
Lieman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 975 (1957).
56. California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 608 n.10 (1978). Justice Stewart was primarily
concerned with the defects he perceived in the Texas v. Florida decision.
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Edelman v. Jordan,57 and, as a consequence, an estate could now bring a
statutory interpleader action in federal district court for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the taxing officials. 8 Justice Powell, believing this
issue merited special emphasis, concurred separately in order to amplify
Justice Stewart's findings.5 9 Justice Brennan agreed with Justices Powell
and Stewart. Accordingly, he joined the Court in voting to dismiss Cali-
fornia's motion, at least until it could be shown that a statutory inter-
pleader action would not or could not be brought.6 °
The concurring Justices relied on the interpretation of the eleventh
amendment expressed in Edelman v. Jordan6 to suggest that Worcester no
longer barred an estate's interpleader of multiple taxing states. In Edelman
v. Jordan a petitioner filed a class action alleging that officials of the Illi-
nois Department of Public Aid were processing welfare applications and
dispensing benefits in a manner that violated federal administrative law
and the United States Constitution. The district court granted an injunc-
tion requiring the state officials to comply with federal standards and or-
dered that the state officials remit wrongfully withheld benefits. The court
of appeals affirmed. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court invalidated
that part of the district court's order compelling the state officials to pay
withheld benefits. The Court held that "a federal court's remedial power,
consistent with the eleventh amendment, is necessarily limited to prospec-
tive injunctive relief, Exparte Young, . . . and may not include a retroac-
tive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury. "62
As the relief sought by the petitioner constituted a retroactive award paya-
ble out of the state treasury, such relief was barred by the eleventh amend-
ment.63 Edelman thus indicated that the Exparte Young doctrine, which
allows a state officer acting unconstitutionally to be sued as an individual
under the eleventh amendment,' applied only when the remedies sought
were prospective and would not operate when the relief sought would re-
quire retroactive payment of funds out of the state treasury. The Edelman
opinion, however, did not otherwise alter the Ex parte Young doctrine.
After Edelman, a state officer could still be sued as an individual only
when allegedly acting unconstitutionally. 65
57. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
58. 437 U.S. at 608 n.10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
59. Id at 615 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Id at 601-02 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated, "[i]t may well be
possible for the Hughes estate to obtain a judgment under the Federal Interpleader Statute
• ..which would be binding on both California and Texas. In this event the precondition
for our original jurisdiction would be lacking." Id at 601-02.
61. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
62. Id at 677.
63. 415 U.S. at 678.
64. 209 U.S. 128, 160 (1908); see text accompanying notes 45 & 46 supra.
65. See generally Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 751
(1978); Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Actions against State
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1420-21 (1975); Comment, Federal Powers and the Eleventh Amendment- Attor-
neys Fees in Private Suits Against the State, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (1975); Comment,
Edelman v. Jordan.• The Case of the Vanishing Retroactive Benefit and the Reappearing De-
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The suggestion of the concurring Justices in California v. Texas that
Edelman had lifted the eleventh amendment bar to a district court inter-
pleader action by the Hughes estate is problematic because the Justices did
not point to any allegedly unconstitutional actions on the part of the taxing
officials of California and Texas. Rather, the Justices affirmatively
recognized Worcester's holding that two states may constitutionally tax a
decedent as their domiciliary.66 An essential element of the Ex parte
Young doctrine as it is presently conceived, therefore, was thus not consid-
ered by the concurring Justices in Calfornia v. Texas. Unless the Hughes
estate can charge state taxing officials with unconstitutional actions, an in-
terpleader action brought to enjoin state officials from collecting taxes
would be against the officials in their official capacity and would be barred
by the eleventh amendment as a suit against the state.
The Justices possibly perceived Edelman v. Jordan as eliminating the
requirement that unconstitutional actions be alleged before a state official
may be sued in his individual capacity, provided that the relief sought was
prospective. 67 Had the Edelman opinion intended to dispose of the long-
standing requirement that a state officer be charged with unconstitutional
conduct before he can be sued in his individual capacity, 68 however, it
would surely have done so expressly. Instead, the Court in Edelman was
careful not to divorce its discussion of Exparte Young from a factual con-
text in which state officers were accused of violating the Constitution.69
Furthermore, the doctrine in Ex parte Young has been upheld since the
Edelman decision, despite the suggestion that its application be limited.7"
Accordingly, the interpretation of Edelman possibly expressed in the con-
curring opinions of California v. Texas is of doubtful validity. The elev-
enth amendment, therefore, remains a bar to an interpleader action
brought by an estate to enjoin multiple death taxation based on domicile.
An allegation of unconstitutional action by individual state taxing officials
is necessary before the eleventh amendment bar can be removed.
Significantly, four Justices in California v. Texas wrote concurring opin-
ions addressing the plight of the estate.7 ' Three Justices quoted the com-
plaints of Professor Chafee that multiple taxation was "highly unfair" and
fense of Sovereign Immunity, 12 Hous. L. REV. 891 (1975); Comment, Edelman and Scheuer."
The Relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and Executive Immunity, 58 MARQ. L.
REV. 741 (1975); Note, Awarding Attorney's Fees Against a State.- The Eleventh Amendment
after Edelman v. Jordan, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 112 (1975); Note, Edelman v. Jordan: .4
New Stage in Eleventh Amendment Evolution, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 496 (1975); 40 Mo. L.
REV. 536 (1975).
66. California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 612 (1978).
67. See id at 616.
68. Exparte Young, decided in 1908, has been affirmed repeatedly. Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951);
Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
69. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
70. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 156 n.6 (1978).




that federal courts should find a remedy.7 2 The attitude evident in the
Justices' opinions could produce a willingness by the Court to find that the
imposition of double death taxes violates the Constitution in some manner.
A possible basis for such a result may be found in the holding of Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania.73 In this case, Pennsylvania initiated
proceedings in state court to escheat unclaimed money-order deposits held
by Western Union. Western Union, while not claiming the fund for itself,
challenged Pennsylvania's power to escheat. Western Union pointed out
that other states potentially entitled to the funds would not be bound by
the Pennsylvania judgment and that Western Union, therefore, faced the
possibility of multiple liability on the same fund. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared the funds to be escheated to Pennsylvania. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a state court's ju-
risdiction to adjudicate property rights is based on the presence of the
property within the state, due process is violated if the holder of the prop-
erty must relinquish the property without the assurance that he will not be
held liable in a second suit elsewhere." Accordingly, since a judgment of
the Pennsylvania courts could not protect Western Union from having to
pay the single obligation twice, the Pennsylvania judgment denied West-
ern Union due process.75
The principles expressed in Western Union arguably are broad enough
to provide a basis for declaring that a state court judgment of death tax
liability based on domicile violates due process if it fails to protect an es-
tate from a second death tax based on an inconsistent determination of
domicile. If the judgment can be established as unconstitutional, then the
activities of state officials in the enforcement of the judgment likewise
would be unconstitutional. This conclusion would modify the result of
Worcester and remove the eleventh amendment bar to an interpleader ac-
tion pursuant to the Exparte Young doctrine.
The success of this argument depends on the extent to which the princi-
72. Id at 608 n.9, 615-16.
73. 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
74. Id at 75. The Court stated that Pennsylvania could not claim that the same debts
or demands could be escheated by two states. The Court gave no basis for this proposition;
however, it did cite as support Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), in which
the Court had stated in a dictum that double escheat is barred by the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution. Id. In Western Union, however, the Court disagreed with the
reliance on the full faith and credit clause. 368 U.S. at 75. Apparently, therefore, the West-
ern Union Court saw the principle as self-evident. See, for example, the assertion of the
Court in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 226 (1905): "It ought to be and it is the object of
courts to prevent the payment of any debt twice over. . . . [A debtor] certainly ought not to
be compelled to pay it a second time .... "
75. Id See generally Lane, Western Union v. Pennsylvania or Whose Mink was Gored?,
18 Bus. LAW. 311 (1962); Note, Jurisdiction: A New Basisfor Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Over
Intangible Property -Western Union Tel Co. v. Pennsylvania (U.S 1961), 50 CALIF. L. REV.
735 (1962); Note, Escheat-Possible Multoile Liability of Abandoned Intangible Personal
Property, II DE PAUL L. REV. 337 (1962); Note, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Penn-
sylvania-Due Process as a Bar to Multiple Escheat of Intangibles, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 484
(1962); 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 331 (1962); 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 478 (1962); 39 U. DET. L.J.
431 (1962); 23 U. PITT. L. REV. 1016 (1962); 15 VAND. L. REV. 1016 (1962).
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pies expressed in Western Union may be extended beyond adjudications
involving a single debt. The inchoate death tax liability of an estate is not,
in the strict sense, a single debt.76 A debt is created only when a taxing
entity has assessed a tax. If two assessments are made, two debts are cre-
ated, despite the fact that the assessments may be based on inconsistent
factual determinations.
The principles expressed in Western Union need not be limited to the
context of single debts. The Western Union opinion characterized the mul-
tiple death tax claims litigated in Texas v. Florida77 as similar "in all mate-
rial respects" to the double escheat of a single debt.78 The essential
similarity is that in both instances a state court judgment fails to protect a
party from claims that would be foreclosed if the fact determinations nec-
essary to support the judgment could be made binding on all claimants.
Thus, in Western Union, had both claimant-states been bound to one adju-
dication of the identity of the obligee, the obligor would have been pro-
tected from the possibility of paying the debt twice. Likewise, when
several states attempt to impose death taxes on one estate, if all claimant-
states could be bound to one adjudication of which state was the state of
domicile, the estate would be protected from paying multiple death taxes.
If this principle is the essence of the basic constitutional infirmity identi-
fied in Western Union, then a direct analogy can be drawn between the
situation in Western Union and the situation in which multiple states claim
the right to impose domiciliary death taxes.7 9 Accordingly, it would be
immaterial that Western Union was decided in the context of the double
escheat of a single debt. In light of the long-standing difficulty experienced
by estates in gaining a single adjudication of domicile, to draw the analogy
between the two situations would be salutary.80
76. H. OLECK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES I (1949).
77. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
78. 368 U.S. at 77.
79. The principle enunciated in Western Union conceivably could be extended to pro-
tect all stakeholders to whom interpleader is unavailable for some reason. One commenta-
tor found such an extension improbable because of long-standing precedent to the contrary.
See McCloskey, The Supreme Court 1961 Term, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 139 (1962). In light
of the long-standing inequities experienced by estates, however, it would be reasonable to
extend Western Union only to the extent necessary to achieve a resolution of the double-
domicile issue.
80. Justice Stewart distinguished Western Union from the death tax situation on the
ground that Western Union held that several states constitutionally may not enforce their
escheat laws on the same tangible property in their own courts, whereas several states consti-
tutionally may enforce their tax laws on the same intangible property in their own courts.
California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 612 n.13 (1978). Justice Stewart was incorrect in identify-
ing the property in Western Union as tangible property; the property was intangible. See
Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 209-10, 212 (1972) (original action by Penn-
sylvania on the issue of which state had the right to escheat the same funds claimed in
Western Union). In addition, it begs the question to say that in one situation there is and in
the other there is not a constitutional impediment. The question is whether the principle in
Western Union may be extended mildly so as to impose a constitutional impediment on the
levying of multiple domiciliary death taxes.
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III. DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
Although the four Justices in Caifornia v. Texas believed that an inter-
pleader action could be used by the Hughes estate to gain a binding adju-
dication of the decedent's domicile, a federal district court dismissed the
interpleader action brought by the Hughes estate subsequent to the dismis-
sal of the original action.8 The district court based its dismissal on a lack
of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.82 The Federal Interpleader Act, the
source of the statutory interpleader action, is based exclusively on diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction.83 The Act requires that at least two parties to a
suit be citizens of different states.84 In a suit between an estate and state
taxing officials, a problem arises. It has long been established that a state
is not a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.85 Consequently, the
estate must find some means of suing the taxing agent as an individual.
Whether a state official or the state is the proper party defendant to a
suit normally depends on whether the state is the real party in interest.
Generally, the state is considered to be the real party in interest when the
relief sought will inure to the benefit of the state alone or when the weight
of a judgment will fall on the state.86 Actions based on the collection of
taxes have been held to involve the state as the real and only beneficial
party in interest.87 Consequently, based on general principles, an inter-
pleader action between an estate and two states would fail for lack of juris-
diction.
One can consider, however, whether diversity jurisdiction can be estab-
lished by an application of the Exparte Young doctrine,88 so that a taxing
official can be sued as the real party in interest if he acts unconstitution-
ally.89 Several courts have held that the analyses required under the elev-
enth amendment and under diversity of citizenship are distinct.9" One
81. Lummis v. White, No. A-78-CA- 148 (W.D. Tex., judgment entered July 27, 1979).
82. Id, slip op. at 4.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
84. Id. This section provides in part that: "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader ... if (1) Two or
more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship ... are claiming or may claim to be entitled
to ... money or property .... " Thus, only minimal diversity is required under the Fed-
eral Interpleader Act. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
85. Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 615, 619 (1971); see cases cited in Annot., 147 A.L.R. 786, 787
(1943).
86. See cases cited in Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 615, 623 (1971). For a discussion of factors
considered in determining who is the real party in interest, see Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 615,
625-40 (1971); Annot., 147 A.L.R. 786, 796 (1943). The names of the parties appearing in
the pleadings is not conclusive on the question of who is the real party in interest. See cases
cited at Annot., 147 A.L.R. 786, 795 (1943).
87. See Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 615, 654 (1971); Annot., 147 A.L.R. 786, 797 (1943).
88. See notes 45 & 46 supra and accompanying text. Jurisdiction in Exparte Young
was not based on diversity of citizenship, 38 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), but on a federal question,
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). See Exparte Young, 309 U.S. 123, 145 (1908).
89. This argument was attempted without success in Lummis v. White, No. A-78-CA-
148 (W.D. Tex., judgment entered July 27, 1979). The court, relying on Worcester, found
that the taxing officials were acting constitutionally and therefore the Exparte Young doc-
trine could not be implemented. 1d, slip op. at 5.
90. National Mkt. Reports v. Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 n.7 (S.D.W. Va. 1978);
1980] 1253
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
federal district court, however, has stated that the analyses, while distinct,
often overlap so that if a state agency is not considered to be the state for
eleventh amendment purposes, it is usually held to be a citizen for diver-
sity purposes. 9' Under the principle enunciated by this court, state officers
acting unconstitutionally arguably can be sued as citizens for diversity pur-
poses because under the eleventh amendment, Exparte Young would op-
erate to separate the officers' actions from those of the state.
The few courts that have considered directly whether a suit alleging un-
constitutional acts by state officers is against the state or against the officers
as individual citizens have not been in agreement. Two federal district
courts have stated that such a suit would be against the individual officer.92
A federal district court and a state court, however, have rejected the mate-
riality of Ex parte Young in a diversity of citizenship analysis.93 Conse-
quently, whether the Exparte Young doctrine may operate in a diversity of
citizenship context is an unsettled question. The recent attacks upon diver-
sity jurisdiction itself could affect a court's willingness to extend diversity
jurisdiction through application of the Exparte Young doctrine. 94 On the
other hand, the continuing problem of gaining judicial review over multi-
ple death tax claims based on domicile could motivate a court to find that
a tax official who acts unconstitutionally can be sued in his individual ca-
pacity for purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.95
S.J. Groves & Sons v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568, 571 (D.N.J. 1967);
DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ore. 1964), a id, 343
F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965); see Weyerhaeuser Co. v. State Roads
Comm'n, 187 F. Supp. 766 (D. Md. 1960).
91. S.J. Groves & Sons v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568, 571 (D.N.J.
1967).
92. Ohio ex rel. Seney v. Swift & Co., 270 F. 141 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 633
(1921), appeal dismissed, 260 U.S. 146 (1922); State Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 6 F. Supp. 1015
(W.D. Tex. 1934). See also Riley v. Worcester County Trust Co., 89 F.2d 59 (1st Cir.), affTd,
302 U.S. 292 (1937).
93. National Mkt. Reports v. Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 n.7 (S.D.W. Va. 1978);
Commonwealth v. Norman, 249 Mass. 123, 144 N.E. 66 (1924).
94. ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1302 (1969); Burger, AnnualReport on the State of the Judiciary, 62 A.B.A.J. 443,
444 (1976) (The Supreme Court Chief Justice stated: "IDliversity cases have no more place
in the federal courts in the second half of the twentieth century. . . than overtime parking
tickets or speeding on the highways simply because the highway is federally financed."
(footnote omitted)); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1968); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction. Positive Side Effects and Po-
tential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979).
95. Justice Stewart, in California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 608 n.10 (1978), suggested that
a possible barrier to an interpleader action to determine domicile for tax purposes is the Tax
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). The Act provides that: "The district courts shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law
where a plain, s eedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." Justice
Stewart concluded that the Act would preclude a federal interpleader action because a state
that does not recognize an earlier determination of domicile by a sister state is not affording
an estate a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. See Annot., 17 L. Ed. 2d 1026 (1967), for a




The search for a comprehensive solution to the problem of multiple
death tax liability continues unabated. While the states have the power to
resolve the problem through judicial or legislative channels, they have not
exercised this power effectively. The one potential means of avoiding
double taxation that is within the estate's control was barred in Worcester
County Trust v. Riley. Recently, however, four Supreme Court Justices
stated that Worcester has been eroded, basing their conclusion on an un-
duly liberal reading of Edelman v. Jordan. Consequently, Worcester re-
mains a vital force unless an alternative ground for modifying its result is
developed. A basis for modifying Worcester arguably may be derived
from the principles enunciated in Western Union Telegraph v. Penn-
sylvania. Even if this analysis is accepted, however, so that the eleventh
amendment no longer bars an interpleader action by an estate, the require-
ments of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction pose an additional barrier.
Consequently, despite the suggestion of four Supreme Court Justices, ac-
cess by an estate to federal district court is not yet a reality.

